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Case No. 990375-CA
Priority No. 2

:

ARGUMENT
Introduction
In its brief, the State asserts that the sentencing judge considered all "legally
relevant" sentencing factors, State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989),
in imposing a consecutive sentence because the sentencing judge ordered a presentence
investigation report to be prepared. State's Brief at 12, 21. The State's position ignores
the undisputed fact that the sentencing judge never mentioned Mr. Hollands' character or
rehabilitative needs. She simply relied on Mr. Hollands' prior criminal record and the
circumstances surrounding the offenses in sentencing him. Although, the State attacks
Mr. Hollands' character and discounts his efforts to rehabilitate himself, the record
indicates that the sentencing judge never considered the State's arguments. Instead, the
sentencing judge overstated Mr. Holland's culpability, relied heavily on his criminal

record and misapplied the law. In any event, the State's efforts to disparage Mr. Hollands
are unpersuasive.

Mr, Hollands9 Character
The State claims that in imposing consecutive sentences, the sentencing judge
must have concluded that Mr. Hollands had poor character because the presentence report
discusses Mr. Hollands' character. State's Brief at 17-18. Because the sentencing judge
never even alluded to Mr. Hollands' character, the State only conjectures that the judge
weighed the character evidence in the presentence report. The State concedes as much in
its brief when it merely argues that the sentencing judge "likely" or "probably" concluded
that Mr. Hollands had poor character. State's Brief at 18. There is simply no support for
concluding that the sentencing judge specifically evaluated Mr. Hollands' character.
In any event, the State's attempt to show Mr. Hollands' poor character fails.
Even the State concedes that Mr. Hollands confessed to his felony offenses in both
Weber and Salt Lake Counties. State's Brief at 3, 6, 17. Mr. Hollands has professed in
both proceedings that he "accept[s] full responsibility for my actions." R. 53: 3A, 5B.
He has not only recognized his drug dependency, he has demonstrated his commitment to
change by participating in substance abuse counseling and working toward receiving his
GED certificate so that, in his words, he can "lead my life in the right direction when I
get out, be responsible and start to be a [productive] member of society." R. 52: 9.
2

The State dismisses Mr. Hollands' acceptance of responsibility by engaging in a
gargantuan effort to portray him as a pathological liar, a dead-beat father, a socio-path
who is unconcerned about "the welfare of others" and a hopeless drug addict. State's
Brief at 17-18. The State's claims are baseless. The State attacks Mr. Hollands for
giving a false name to the police and for being reluctant to confess his involvement in the
present offense and in the Weber County crimes until he was confronted with the
evidence against him. Regardless of the timing and the manner in which Mr. Hollands
admitted his involvement in the crimes and accepted responsibility, the fact remains
undisputed that he did. Mr. Hollands had no obligation to confess; in fact, he had a
constitutional right to remain silent and to compel the State to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, in Mr. Hollands' words, he "realized that this is not the
life I want to leed [sic]," and so he admitted his involvement, took significant steps to quit
using drugs and to move on with his life.
The State also erroneously brands Mr. Hollands as "manipulative" for "possibly []
outright [lying]" at the sentencing hearing when he claimed to be participating in drug
education classes in prison. State's Briefs at 17. The basis for this purported
misrepresentation is a statement in the presentence report that despite Mr. Hollands'
history of drug usage he "has never received any substance abuse counseling." R. 53: 6A.
The State's conclusion that Mr. Hollands' lied is unfounded. Rather than concluding Mr.
Hollands lied, the obviously more rational explanation is that, outside of prison, he has
3

never received drug counseling such as through court-supervised probation or as a patient
in a drug therapy program. There is no basis for assuming, however, that he lied to the
sentencing judge about taking drug education courses in prison.
The State lodges further unfounded attacks on Mr. Hollands' character for leaving
the scene of an accident "without thought for the welfare of others[.],f State's Brief at 17.
In the first place, the district attorney conceded below that the other driver caused the
accident. R. 48. Since Mr. Hollands was actually the victim of the mishap, his flight
from the accident is not as callous as the State would have this Court believe. Secondly,
there was no indication in the record below that anyone was hurt in the traffic accident.
Accordingly, the State has no basis for concluding that Mr. Hollands was not concerned
about others' welfare.
In a further attempt to show Mr. Hollands' alleged bad character, the State blasts
him for not supporting his illegitimate child and for being physically abusive in the past
toward the child's mother who he planned to marry. State's Brief at 18. As is the case
with all of the attacks on Mr. Hollands' character, the State fails to acknowledge the root
cause of Mr. Hollands' negative behavior: his addiction to drugs. Since Mr. Hollands
recognized his drug dependency and stopped using drugs, his relationship with his fiancee
has improved and he has committed to provide for her and his child. R. 53: 15B.
Specifically, Mr. Hollands has determined to change his life because, "I have a lot more
going for me out there th[a]n in [prison]." R. 53: 3A.
'-.

A
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The State's entire discussion of Mr. Hollands' character is fundamentally flawed.
First of all, because there is no indication in the record below that the sentencing judge
ever considered the arguments the State raises on appeal, the State can only speculate that
the sentencing judge "likely" or "probably" weighed the State's claims. Second, if Mr.
Hollands' character is as poor as the State maintains, it is unlikely that both the district
attorney and the Department of Probation and Parole would have recommended
concurrent sentences.
Third, the State's attacks ring hollow because Mr. Hollands' prior poor behavior
and personal problems are directly attributable to his drug addiction. R. 53: 18B. As the
record demonstrates, his arrests in Salt Lake and Weber Counties were a turning point.
Since that time, he has accepted responsibility for his actions, committed to change his
life and has taken advantage of the opportunities in prison to better himself. Despite the
State's protestations that Mr. Hollands did not accept responsibility sooner, the State
cannot dispute that he has done so.
Contrary to the State's attempt to distinguish State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930 (Utah
1998), that case supports Mr. Hollands' demonstrated good character. The Utah Supreme
Court concluded in that case that the defendant established his good character because he
"voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility for the crimes he committed [and] he
has expressed a commitment and hope to improve himself." Id. at 938. The same is true
for Mr. Hollands. He confessed to his crimes voluntarily, pleaded guilty, admitted his
5

drug problem, sought out drug counseling in prison and is working towards receiving his
GED certificate. It is inconsequential when or the manner in which Mr. Hollands
changed his attitude and his behavior. The key under Galli is that the defendant actually
changes.

Rehabilitative Needs
In a similar vein, the State contends that Mr. Hollands is not a good candidate for
rehabilitation because he did not seek treatment on his own or recognize his drug problem
prior to his arrest in Weber County. State's Brief at 18-19. Again, the sentencing judge
never considered these arguments. Further, the State's claims are illogical. The State
essentially complains that Mr. Hollands' acceptance of responsibility and commitment to
change was not "genuine" because he did not do so when the State thinks he should have.
State's Brief at 18. The logical conclusion of the State's position is that criminal
defendants should be punished, rather than credited, if they take responsibility for their
crimes after being arrested versus before.
In support of its discussion of Mr. Hollands' rehabilitative needs, the State cites
State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). That case is inapposite. In
contrast to the defendant in that case, Mr. Hollands has never had substance abuse
counseling, nor has he "repeatedly been diagnosed as a substance abuser[.]" Id. at 652.
Further, contrary to the defendant's proven refusal to change his behavior in Schweitzer,
6

this case and the Weber County convictions were a turning point for Mr. Hollands. He
has committed to stop using drugs and to better his life and he has taken advantage of the
opportunities in prison to ensure he keeps his commitments. He is, thus, primed to
address his drug problems and resolve them.
There is no hint in the record below that the sentencing judge ever considered Mr.
Hollands' rehabilitative needs. Specifically, the judge failed to recognize that, because
Mr. Hollands' problems are directly linked to drugs, once Mr. Hollands' addresses his
drug addiction, he would resolve his past problems and there would be no reason to keep
him incarcerated. Nevertheless, under the terms of his consecutive sentences, Mr.
Hollands will serve, at least, 30 additional months regardless of whether more prison time
would benefit him or society.
The imposition of consecutive sentences essentially deprives the Board of
Pardons and Parole (the "Board") of its statutory discretion to fix Mr. Hollands'
maximum term of imprisonment. State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995). The
Board, rather than the sentencing court, is in the best position to "monitor [the]
defendant's subsequent behavior and possible progress toward rehabilitation while in
prison and adjust the maximum sentence accordingly." Id. However, regardless of
whether Mr. Hollands addresses his drug addiction prior to the expiration of the minimum
terms of his consecutive sentences, the Board could not release him, even though
continued incarceration would serve no purpose.
7

The State attempts to gloss over this issue by noting that under Utah Code
Annotated section 77-27-9(1 )(b) (1999) the Board has discretion to release prisoners prior
to the expiration of their minimum term of imprisonment if "mitigating circumstances"
exist. The State neglects to mention that the Board rarely exercises that authority. This is
especially true for an offender such as Mr. Hollands who has no compelling
circumstances such as failing health, old age or other extreme conditions that warrant
early release. Mr. Hollands can expect to serve the full term of his minimum, consecutive
sentences.
Because the sentencing judge failed to consider Mr. Hollands' rehabilitative needs,
the imposition of consecutive sentences was an abuse of discretion. State v. Galli. 967
P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). In any event, Mr. Hollands has demonstrated that he is a
good candidate for rehabilitation. Accordingly, this Court should allow the Board the
"flexibility to adjust [Mr. Hollands5] prison stay to match his progress in rehabilitation
and preparation to return to society." People v. StrunL 846 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Utah 1993).

Nature and Gravity of the Offenses
The sentencing judge's heavy reliance on the nature and gravity of the Weber
County offense was also an abuse of discretion. Mr. Hollands concedes that his
involvement in the methamphetamine lab was extensive and serious. The sentencing
judge properly recognized that Mr. Hollands was appropriately denied probation even
8

though he incurred his first felony conviction. However, Mr. Hollands' involvement in
that crime was not so egregious or remarkable as to warrant additional punishment. Mr.
Hollands' 15-year sentence for his role in that crime was a severe sanction that adequately
punished him. The sentencing judge in this case abused her discretion in further
punishing him by imposing consecutive sentences. R. 52: 10.
The sentencing judge's statement that Mr. Hollands did not "deserve a break"
confirms that the judge overemphasized Mr. Hollands' culpability. It also demonstrates
that she misunderstood the law. As the State concedes, Utah law favors concurrent
sentences over consecutive ones. State v. Galll 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998); People v.
Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). There was nothing extraordinary about either
the Weber County offense or the present crime to defeat the presumption of concurrent
sentencing.

Criminal History
Likewise, the sentencing judge overvalued Mr. Hollands' criminal history.
Because all of Mr. Hollands' arrests and convictions stem from his addiction to drugs, the
number of his arrests and convictions are misleading. R. 53: 18B. Once Mr. Hollands
resolves his drug problem, it is reasonable to assume that his criminal behavior will cease.
Accordingly, his lengthy record is not as much a concern as are his rehabilitative needs.
Further, the minor nature of Mr. Hollands' prior record does not warrant
9

consecutive sentencing. The State attempts in vain to portray Mr. Hollands as a violent
offender. Although Mr. Hollands was convicted of crimes that are technically labeled
violent, there is only one instance in his entire history during which he directed any
violence toward another person: a juvenile arrest for assault. R. 53: 8. Other than that
offense, for which the juvenile courts declined to detain him, there is no indication that
Mr. Hollands has directed any violence toward anyone. The lack of violence in this case
is, at least, as compelling as the minimal violence in Galh, where although the defendant
only used a pellet gun to rob three businesses, his crimes created a great potential for
violence and fear in his victims. 967 P.2d at 938.
Despite the State's concern that Mr. Hollands was arrested as a juvenile for a
second degree felony theft, the juvenile court apparently did not regard that offense as
serious since it merely fined him and then ordered him to write an essay. R. 53: 8B. The
State's overreaction to Mr. Hollands' history of relatively minor, non-violent offenses is
similar to the sentencing judge's overreaction. As the Utah Supreme Court implied in
State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah 1986), the sentencing judge must not allow a
defendant's prior record to "unduly influence" the sentencing decision. The sentencing
judge's extreme reliance on the number of Mr. Holland's arrests without considering the
remaining "legally relevant factors" such as his acceptance of responsibility and his
rehabilitative needs was an abuse of discretion. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135
(Utah 1989).
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Imposing Consecutive Sentences was Inherently Unfair
The sentencing judge's decision to impose consecutive sentences was also an
abuse of discretion because it was "inherently unfair." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,
887 (Utah 1978); State v. HouL 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). As the State
alludes to in its brief, State's Brief at 11, the sentencing judge essentially nullified the
plea bargain by ordering the sentences to run consecutively. Rather than giving Mr.
Hollands the benefit of zero to five years for a third degree felony, the sentencing judge
ordered the sentence to run consecutive to a one to fifteen year sentence for a second
degree felony in Weber County, the same degree of felony that he was originally charge
with committing in this case. Thus, by ordering the sentence to run consecutively, the
sentencing judge simply replaced the sentence for a third degree felony with one for a
second degree felony.
Nullifying plea bargains in this manner will have a "chilling11 effect on criminal
defendants' willingness to accept responsibility. State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887
(Utah 1978). Punishing defendants for accepting responsibility and pleading guilty places
them in a no-win situation. They have no incentive to plead guilty, and if they proceed to
trial they risk losing the possibility of a lower sentence a plea bargain would otherwise
offer. Either way, they have little to gain and much to lose. This catch 22 is not only
"inherently unfair" to criminal defendants, Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887, it undermines public
confidence in the criminal justice system.
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CONCLUSION
Because the sentencing judge failed to consider all legally relevant sentencing
factors, Mr. Hollands requests that this Court remand this matter to the trial court and to
order the sentencing judge to resentence him to a concurrent term of zero to five years.
SUBMITTED, this l£± day of November, 1999.

KENT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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